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When Can the Courtroom Be Closed

In Criminal Proceedings?
by Frederick W. Goundry, III

The sixth amendment provides that
"in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a ... public
trial .... "1 At the same time, the public
and the press, under the first amendment, have a right to open criminal proceedings, including pretrial suppression
hearings, voir dire, and the trial itself. 2
The right to an open trial is, however,
not absolute - the trial judge has some
discretion on whether to close the courtroom to the public and press. 3 Closure
of the courtroom has been held to be
proper to protect witnesses, 4 to preserve order in the court, s and to avoid
prejudice to either party. 6
This article reviews the development
of federal and state case law concerning
the right to an open trial. It suggests that
a specific, articulable factual determination should be made, in all circumstances, by a trial judge before the courtroom can properly be closed to the
public and press. The judge must first
consider other alternatives before ordering closure. This article also concludes
that a closure order should be no broader
than absolutely necessary.
Supreme Court Decisions on the
Right to a Public Trial
In the case of In re Oliver, 7 the United
States Supreme Court examined whether
a judge has the right to charge, convict,
and sentence a witness to ninety days in
jail, on the belief that the witness committed perjury in his courtroom. 8 The
Oliver Court described the facts as
amounting to a secret "one-man grand
jury"9 and held that the proceeding was
unconstitutional under the Due Process
Clause of the fourteenth amendment.lo

In addition, the Oliver Court noted that
the public trial guarantee was exclusively for the benefit and protection of
the accused. I I
In 1966, the Court decided the case of
Sheppard v. Maxwell. 12 In Sheppard, the
Court addressed the effect adverse publicity had on a defendant's right to a fair
trial.13 In reversing the defendant's conviction, the Court held that the defendant was deprived of a fair trial because
the trial judge failed to prevent "inherently prejudicial publicity."14 The
Court indicated that a trial judge has a
duty to ensure that prejudicial publicity
never outweighs a defendant's right to a
fair trial. IS This issue did not receive
judicial scrutiny again for more than a
decade l6 until the Court decided the
case of Gannett Co. v. DePasquale. 17
In Gannett, the trial judge ordered a
pretrial hearing closed to the public and
press upon motion by the defendant. 18
In upholding the closure order, the
Gannett Court held that the constitution did not give the public an affirmative right to open pretrial proceedings
where both the prosecution and defense
agreed that the defendant's fair trial
rights would be put in serious jeopardy. 19
The Gannett majority declined to consider whether the first amendment carries an independent "right of access" for
the public and press to attend criminal
proceedings.20 In dissent, Justice Blackmun argued that the fourteenth amendment prohibited courts from ordering
closure without first considering the
public's interest in maintaining an open
proceeding.21
ThefoUowingyear, the Supreme Court
in Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia 22

held for the first time that the constitution guarantees the right of the public
and press to attend criminal trialS. 23 In
Richmond Newspapers, a defendant accused of murder requested that his trial
be closed to avoid potential prejudice. 24
Petitioner, a newspaper publishing company, argued that the trial judge should
have first considered the alternatives before ordering the proceedings closed. 2s
In agreeing with the petitioner's position, the Court concluded that there is a
"presumption of openness" in criminal
trials in the United States. 26 The majority
further noted that justice was best served
by allowing the public to observe the
proceedingsp and absent an overriding
interest, the first amendment guaranteed this right of access. 28 The Court
noted, however, that the newly recognized right of access was not absolute,
and that trial courts would still be permitted to impose reasonable restrictions
to ensure that the defendant was given a
fair trial. 29
Two years after Richmond Newspapers, the Court further defined the
limitations of courtroom closure in
GlobeNewspaperCo. v. Superior Court. 30
The trial court in Globe Newspaper
construed a Massachusetts statute as
requiring mandatory closure during the
testimony of a minor victim in a sexoffense trial. 31 On appeal, the Supreme
Court held that the statute, as applied by
the trial court, violated the first
amendment.32
The Globe Newspaper Court set forth
a strict test for justifying closure in such
cases. First, there must be a compelling
governmental interest which requires
denial of the public's right of access, and
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second, the right must be narrowly tailored to serve that interest. 33 Applying
the above test, the Court held that the
state's interest in protecting minor victims of sex crimes from further trauma
and embarrassment was not sufficiently
compelling to permit mandatory closure. 34 The Court also suggested that the
trial court's closure order should have
been more narrowly tailored to satisfy
the requirements of the first amendment. 35
In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior
Court 36 (hereinafter 'Press-Enterprise
1"), the Supreme Court considered
whether constitutional guarantees of
public trial extended to voir dire proceedings. 37 In Press-Enterprise I, the trial
judge allowed access during the "general
voir dire," but then closed the remainder
of the voir dire proceeding. 38 After the
jury was empaneled, the petitioner requested a transcript of the closed portion of voir dire, but the motion was
denied by the trial judge in order to
protect the privacy of the jurors. 39
The Press-Enterprise I Court applied
the two-part test of Globe Newspaper4°
and held that the presumption of openness may be overcome only by a finding
that an open proceeding would threaten
an overriding interest, such as the defendant's right to a fair trial or the prospective jurors' privacy interests. 41 By implication, the Supreme Court extended
the guarantee of public trial to voir dire
proceedings. 42 Chief Justice Burger,
writing for the majority, said that closure must be "narrowly tailored to serve
that [overriding] interest. "43 Also, the
interest is to be clearly articulated along
with specific findings so that an appellate court can determine the propriety
of the closure order.
This presumption, according to the
Court, had not been rebutted in this
case. In addition, the Court held that the
trial judge had made no findings indicating that the alternatives to closure had
even been considered. 44 The decision
appears to have rested on three key
facts: (1) the trial judge refused to
release the transcripts of the voir dire
proceedings; (2) the trial judge failed to
make particularized findings; and (3)
the trial judge neglected to consider
alternatives to closure. 45
The standard enunciated in PressEnterprise I has been applied in subseIS-The Law Forum/21.1

quent cases in defining the constitutional right to an open trial. For example,
in Waller v. Georgia,46 the prosecution
moved to close a pretrial suppression
hearing, seeking to avoid unnecessary
publicity which may have rendered some
evidence inadmissible. 47 The trial judge
granted the motion and issued a closure
order over the defendant's objection. 48
In reversing the trial court's decision,
the Supreme Court held that the defendant's sixth amendment right to a public
trial applied to pretrial suppression hearings.49 The Supreme Court noted that
the" explicit sixth amendment right of
the accused is no less protective of a
public trial than the implicit first
amendment right of the press and public. "50 As a result, the Waller decision
expanded the "overriding interest" standard to criminal defendants who object
to closure based on their sixth amendment right to a public trial. 51

nthe interest is to be
clearly articulated
along with specific
findings . ... "
The most recent word from the Supreme Court on the right to public trial
came in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior
Court5 2 (hereinafter 'Press-Enterprise
11"). In Press-Enterprise II, the presiding
magistrate denied a motion by members
of the news media to obtain access to
transcripts of a preliminary hearing, citing potential prejudicial publicity, and
ordered the record sealed. 53 On a writ of
mandate, the California Supreme Court
held that Press-Enterprise I and Globe
Newspaper extended only to criminal
trials. 54
The Supreme Court, in Press-Enterprise II, held that the qualified first
amendment right of access attaches at
criminal preliminary hearings as conducted in California. 55 Chief Justice
Burger reasoned that "[b]ecause of its
extensive scope, the preliminary hearing is often the final and most important
step in the criminal proceeding. "56 Therefore, such preliminary hearings cannot
be closed absent specific findings dem-

onstrating a "substantial probability" that
closure was essential to preserve an
overriding interest and unless such closure was closely tailored to serve that
interest.57 The majority concluded that
the closure order and the shielding of
the preliminary hearing transcripts were
inappropriate in such a case. 58
Circumstances Where Closure Has
Traditionally Been Justified
The preceding Supreme Court decisions define the scope of the sixth
amendment right to a public trial and
the first amendment right to access, and
thus enunciate the constitutional standard for closure. Next, appellate court
decisions where compelling interest sufficient to warrant excluding the public
and press from the courtroom was found
will be discussed.
It should be noted that when the trial
judge wrongfully excludes the public or
press from the courtroom, and the defendant enters a timely objection, prejudice will be presumed; that is, the
defendant will not have to show he was
actually prejudiced. 59 At the same time, a
defendant or his attorney may waive
defendant'S right to a public trial either
expressly or by failing to object to the
closure order in a timely fashion.
Closure to Prevent Disturbance by
Spectators or Defendant
Appellate courts have generally held
that where, during the course of a trial, it
appears that a disturbance caused by the
defendant or spectators may lead to violence, the trial judge will be justified in
excluding individuals from the courtroom. 60 At the same time, the trial judge
must still explore the reasonable alternatives in order to ensure that the defendant has not been denied his sixth
amendment right to a public trial. 61 A
closure order which extends beyond
the actual need to prevent the disruption may violate the defendant's right to
a fair trial. 62
Exclusion of Spectators to Avoid
Intimidation of Witness
Where a factual showing on the record
is made that a witness was intimidated
or threatened, an exclusion order,
limited to the particular spectators responsible for the threats, has been held
as not violative of the defendant's right

to a public trial. 63 On the other hand,
appellate courts have been reluctant to
approve an exclusion order in the
absence of overtly menacing behavior
on the part of the excluded spectators.64
Also, it should be noted that some state
constitutions contain provisions which
may provide broader protection to the
right to a public trial than the United
States Constitution.65 Therefore, the applicable state provisions should be considered, along with the first and sixth
amendments, in assessing the limitations
on the trial court in excluding spectators from the courtroom. 66

any additional entrants.7 4 This practice
has been justified on the ground that the
jury could be distracted during this critical phase of the trial. 75 Many jurisdictions lock the courtroom doors during
the jury charge without making a determination whether a particular interest
could be prejudiced by keeping the
courtroom closed. 76
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